On what grounds did the Supreme court decide not to uphold his extradition?
The concluding remarks by Justice Fennelly in this Judgement indicate why;
41. If it is to order the surrender of the respondent to Hungary to serve the sentence of imprisonment which has been imposed on him by the Hungarian Court, this Court must be satisfied that he falls within one of the headings of s. 10 of the Act of 2003, as amended. Only paragraph (d) is capable of applying. It is a condition of the application of that provision that the respondent have “fled." For reasons already given, I am satisfied that he did not “flee.” If the court were to hold otherwise, it would be acting contrary to the clear meaning of the Act of 2003, i.e., contra legem. 42. It follows that his surrender cannot be ordered. For these reasons, the appeal should be dismissed. Section 10 of the European Arrest Warrant Act 2003 (amended) states
inter alia;
S. 10 of the Act of 2003 gives effect, in Irish law, to the general obligation to surrender made incumbent on Member States, by the Framework Decision. That section, as amended by the Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offences) Act, 2005, provides:
10.—Where a judicial authority in an issuing state duly issues a European arrest warrant in respect of a person—
(a) against whom that state intends to bring proceedings for an offence to which the European arrest warrant relates,
(b) who is the subject of proceedings in that state for an offence to which the European arrest warrant relates,
(c) who has been convicted of, but not yet sentenced in respect of, an offence to which the European arrest warrant relates, or
(d) on whom a sentence of imprisonment or detention has been imposed in respect of an offence to which the European arrest warrant relates, and who fled from the issuing state before he or she—
(i) commenced serving that sentence, or
(ii) completed serving that sentence,
that person shall, subject to and in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the Framework Decision, be arrested and surrendered to the issuing state.When deciding matters embracing (in this case) Statute Law, the wording of any documents, warrants and so on is of critical importance as the eventual outcome of any appeal to the validity of any previous decision made by any other court will rest on the precise wording of the Act under which the appeal is brought.
In this case, irrespective of the apparent ‘injustice’ thought to be evident in the findings of the Irish Supreme Court, the reasoning of Justice Fennelly appears to in keeping with the precise wording of the Act.
Speculation by deciding Judges - as to the weight of the crimes (or actions) of any defendant and how these impinge on the simple scale of humanity or what can reasonably be considered by society to be a basic right or wrong – seldom forms any substantial part of any decision made in such cases: The law, as stated in the wording of the relevant Act or legislation, is the governing factor.
http://www.courts.ie/Judgments.nsf/1073ee973657c17a80256ec4002f18aa/fd7fbd2d0e422eed802573fc005307fe?OpenDocument